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COMMENTS
THE "THREE STRIKES" DILEMMA: CRIME
REDUCTION AT ANY PRICE?
I. INTRODUCTION
The 1993 kidnapping and murder of a twelve-year-old
Petaluma girl named Polly Klaas focused the attention of
California and the nation on the issue of violent crime, and in
particular, on the proper treatment of violent repeat offend-
ers.' In response to this well publicized crime,2 the California
Legislature passed a tough sentence enhancement statute
popularly known as "Three Strikes You're Out."3 In addition,
California voters passed an almost identical initiative mea-
sure in the November, 1994 election.4 Three strikes has the
stated purpose of ensuring "longer prison sentences and
greater punishment for those who commit a felony and have
been previously convicted of serious and/or violent offenses."5
1. Stan Sinberg, Polly's Fate Should Be the Signal for Us to Change Our
Focus, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 15, 1993, at 23 ("The recent kidnapping and murder of
Polly Klaas was one of those cases that from time to time hits a nationwide raw
nerve and embodies all the things that are good and bad about this land.").
2. John Borland, '3 Strikes' Initiative Fails the Klaas Test, CAL. J. WKLY.,
July 25, 1994, at 5 ("For better or worse, California's '3 Strikes, You're Out' law
owes its existence to Polly Klaas. Before the kidnapping and murder of the
Petaluma girl, the sentencing proposal had little of the momentum and unques-
tioning support it now claims.").
3. A.B. 971, 1994 Cal Stat. 12 (Codified at CAL. PENAL CODE § 667). The
legislative three strikes measure amends Penal Code § 667(b). For the pur-
poses of this comment, the three strikes measure passed by the California Leg-
islature will be referred to as the "legislative measure" while the three strikes
proposal passed by voter initiative will be referred to as the "initiative mea-
sure." Because the two measures are textually identical, the new law will be
referred to generally as "three strikes," encompassing the identical provisions of
both the legislative and initiative versions. Finally, all references to specific
statutory provisions of three strikes will refer to the legislative version, which
appears at Penal Code § 667.
4. Donna Alvarado, 'Three Strikes' Is In, but Other Propositions Out, SAN
JosE MERCURY NEWS, Nov. 9, 1994, at 8EL.
5. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(b) (West Supp. 1995).
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Among other things, the law provides that a defendant
convicted of a felony6 who has been previously convicted of a
serious or violent felony7 will serve double the normal sen-
tence for the current offense." A defendant convicted of a cur-
rent felony with two prior serious or violent felony convictions
will serve twenty-five years to life in prison.9 The current law
is generally considered one of the toughest enhancement stat-
utes in the country, 10 and has engendered considerable con-
troversy.1 Proponents see the measure as a long overdue re-
sponse to the problem of repeat offenders that will
significantly reduce violent crime in California. 12 Opponents
argue that the law sweeps too broadly, incarcerating many
nonviolent offenders at incredible cost to taxpayers. 13 The
law has been in effect for less than a year and has already
caused substantial confusion in trial courts.' 4 With a number
of appeals planned by both prosecutors and defense attor-
neys, the ultimate impact and scope of the three strikes con-
troversy is certain to be resolved by the California Supreme
Court.'
This comment begins by examining the background of
three strikes, including the atmosphere in which the law was
6. For the purposes of this comment, a defendant's most recent offense or
crime will be referred to as the "current felony," "third strike," or "triggering
offense." The current offense is the crime that ultimately subjects the offender
to an enhanced sentence pursuant to the three strikes law. The current offense
should be distinguished from a defendant's prior convictions, also referred to as
"past offenses" or "priors," which count towards the ultimate total of two or
three "strikes" but do not by themselves "trigger" a three strikes sentence
enhancement.
7. See supra note 6.
8. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e)(1) (West Supp. 1995).
9. Id. § (e)(2).
10. Jane Gross, Drive to Keep Repeat Felons in Prison Gains in California,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 1993, at 1.
11. Can 'Three Strikes'Really Make a Difference?, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 6, 1994,
at A23.
12. Id.; see also RICHAD SINGER, JUST DESERTS: SENTENCING BASED ON
EQUALITY AND DESERT (1979) (detailing the retribution theory of punishment,
which serves as the philosophical foundation of the three strikes movement).
13. See Can 'Three Strikes' Really Make a Difference?, supra note 11, at
A23.
14. Harriet Chiang, Chaotic Enforcement of '3 Strikes', S.F. CHRON., June
30, 1994, at Al.
15. Bill Kisliuk, Supreme Court Not Ready to Tackle '3 Strikes', THE RE-
CORDER, July 26, 1994, at 2 ("[T]he California Supreme Court will await convic-
tions before weighing in on the expected tide of 'three strikes' cases.").
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passed.16 Because both a legislative and an initiative version
of three strikes have been passed, the comment explores
which of the two presently governs California.17 After detail-
ing the major provisions of three strikes,' 8 the background
section explores what the three strikes law leaves out, and
the significance of the omission.' 9 Finally, the background
section examines two cases in which local trial courts strug-
gled to interpret and solve the three strikes dilemma.20
The particular problem addressed by this comment in-
volves a cost-benefit analysis of three strikes.2 The analysis
section demonstrates that while three strikes will, in fact, re-
duce violent crime,22 it will do so only at enormous cost. The
various "costs" discussed in the analysis include the financial
costs, 23 the overly broad scope of the law,2 4 the pressure it
will place on the criminal justice system,25 and, ultimately,
the likelihood that three strikes will seriously undermine the
credibility of the criminal justice system.26 Finally, the anal-
ysis evaluates the effectiveness of the solutions offered by the
two local trial courts.2 7
This comment concludes that three strikes is an under-
standable response by politicians and voters to an intolerable
crime rate and a well-publicized tragedy. The perfectly legiti-
mate objective of the law is to reduce violent crime by incar-
cerating violent felons until they are no longer a threat to so-
ciety. Unfortunately, the law will be exorbitantly expensive
and will place intolerable strains on the justice system. The
challenge presented by three strikes, therefore, is to retain
those provisions of the law that are effective in fighting crime
while modifying or eliminating those provisions that lead to
enormous expense and the ultimate erosion of the legitimacy
of the criminal justice system. The purpose of this comment
is to demonstrate both the strengths and weaknesses of three
16. See discussion infra part IIA.
17. See discussion infra part II.B.
18. See discussion infra part II.C.
19. See discussion infra part II.D.
20. See discussion infra part H.E.
21. See discussion infra part III.
22. See discussion infra part IV.
23. See discussion infra part V.B.
24. See discussion infra part IV.C.
25. See discussion infra part IV.D.
26. See discussion infra part W.E.
27. See discussion infra part IV.F.
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strikes and offer proposals that could make it less costly and
more effective.28
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Atmosphere in Which Three Strikes was Passed
1. The Polly Klaas Story and the Political Response
Twelve-year-old Polly Klaas was kidnapped from her
Petaluma home on October 1, 1993.29 An unprecedented vol-
unteer search effort30 proved to be in vain when Polly's body
was discovered two months later.3 ' Richard Allen Davis was
arrested and charged with the kidnapping and murder, and
his prior criminal record3 2 sparked a national debate over the
issue of repeat offenders.33 The tragedy coincided with the
1994 senate and gubernatorial campaigns, and public out-
rage, politics, and a torrent of media coverage of the tragedy
converged to make violent crime a prominent campaign is-
sue.3 4 The California Legislature took immediate action to
implement a bill to increase sentences for violent offenders. 5
28. See discussion infra part V.
29. Ron Sonenshine, Klaas, Clinton Talk Father to Father, S.F. CHRON.,
Dec. 21, 1993, at A3.
30. The two month search for Polly Klaas was unprecedented in size and
scope, involving thousands of volunteers. Volunteers Against Crime; for Polly's
Sake, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 11, 1993, at 30. Millions of reward posters were
sent throughout the world and composite sketches of the abductor were faxed to
police forces across the country. Melinda Beck, The Sad Case of Polly Klaas,
NEWSWEEK, Dec. 13, 1993, at 40.
31. Beck, supra note 30, at 40.
32. Davis began burglarizing homes at the age of twelve. Oliver Starr Jr.,
The Case of Richard Davis, NAT'L REV., May 30, 1994, at 34. His crimes esca-
lated to assault, robbery, sex crimes, and kidnapping, and as an adult he was
arrested seventeen times. Id. He had twelve prior arrests before he was sent to
state prison for the first time in 1975. Id. Davis pleaded guilty to kidnapping,
robbery, assault, and burglary, and was sentenced to one to twenty-five years.
Id. His sentence was recalculated and he served only five years. Id. In 1984,
Davis was sentenced to sixteen years in prison for abducting and robbing a wo-
man. Id. He served eight years, and, three months after his release, he alleg-
edly strangled Polly Klaas. Id.
33. See id.
34. Rick Kushman, Polly's Death Spurs Political Action, SACRAMENTO BEE,
Dec. 11, 1993, at Al ("In the aftermath of the abduction and killing of Polly
Klaas, politicians in both parties have been sprinting to support anti-crime
measures.").
35. Daniel Franklin, The Right Three Strikes, WASH. MONTHLY, Sept. 1994,
at 25.
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The most readily available piece of proposed legislation
was the brainchild of Mike Reynolds, a Fresno photographer
whose daughter was murdered in a purse-snatching in
1992.36 The Reynolds plan, dubbed "Three Strikes and
You're Out" after a similar Washington State measure, had
received scant attention from politicians or the public prior to
the Klaas case. 7 Reynolds intended to pass the measure by
initiative of the voters, but, prior to the Klaas case, had gath-
ered only 35,000 of the 385,000 signatures needed to place
the measure on the November 1994 ballot.38 On the Monday
morning after Polly's body was found, Reynolds' headquar-
ters was flooded with calls in support of the measure. 9
Outside the Polly Klaas Foundation offices in Petaluma, peo-
ple stood in line to sign the petition at the rate of 15,000 per
day.4° Within weeks, over 300,000 signatures were collected.
The Reynolds initiative qualified easily for the November bal-
lot as Proposition 184.41
A legislative three strikes proposal, almost identical to
the Proposition 184 initiative measure, was introduced in the
state assembly by Assemblyman Bill Jones as AB 971.42 Few
politicians had the courage to criticize the proposal, and
warnings that it was unworkable, expensive, and swept too
broadly went unheeded.43 On the willingness of politicians to
pass the bill, State Senator Newton Russel said, "I don't
think we have any choice."44 The Assembly approved the bill
sixty-three to nine,45 and on March 3, 1994, the Senate ap-
proved the bill by a vote of twenty-nine to seven.46 Governor
Wilson signed the bill on March 7 and, as "emergency legisla-
tion," three strikes immediately became the law of the
state.47
36. Kushman, supra note 34, at Al.
37. Gross, supra note 10, at 1.
38. Id. at 22.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1.
41. Id. at 22.
42. A.B. 971, 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. 56 (West).
43. See Franklin, supra note 35, at 25.
44. Id. at 26.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West Supp. 1995).
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Proposition 184 remained on the November ballot and
passed easily by a two to one margin.4" Because the Reynolds
measure had already been enacted by the California Legisla-
ture, passage of the initiative merely ratified existing state
law and made amendment of the law much more difficult.49
The Legislature can now change the statute only with a two-
thirds vote of both houses.50
2. An Unlikely Opponent
Ironically, Polly's father, Marc Klaas, was one of the only
vocal opponents of Proposition 184.51 Although he initially
supported the measure, Klaas changed his views after exam-
ining possible alternatives and closely scrutinizing the likely
effect of three strikes.52 Klaas' criticism of three strikes fo-
cused on two factors.53 First, the law swept too broadly, re-
quiring life sentences for essentially nonviolent criminals.54
Second, the law was simply too expensive, requiring either
massive taxation or a shift in spending from education, reha-
bilitation, and law enforcement to support prison construc-
tion.55 In Klaas' words,
Proposition 184 is too hard on soft crime and too soft on
hard crime. By focusing as much attention on nonviolent
crime as it does on violent crime, Proposition 184 ignores
the real issue.... In the depth of despair that all Califor-
nians shared with my family immediately after Polly's
murder, we blindly supported the 'three strikes and you're
out' initiative in the mistaken belief that it dealt only with
violent crimes. Instead, three out of four of the crimes it
addresses aren't violent. Either we pay for our mistake by
ratifying a bad law and being taxed to our inner organs to
deal out cruel and unusual punishment to nonviolent of-
fenders, or together we correct our costly mistake.5 6
48. Alvarado, supra note 4, at 8EL.
49. Decision '94: Special Guide to California's Elections, L.A. TIMES, Oct.
30, 1994, at W10.
50. Id.
51. Borland, supra note 2, at 5.
52. Id.
53. Marc Klaas, It's Too Hard on Soft Crime and Too Soft on Hard Crime,
S.F. CHRON., Oct. 6, 1994, at A23.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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B. What is the Law Anyway? The Tension Between the
Statutory and Initiative Measures
The legislative version of three strikes passed in March,
1994 was California law from March to November, 1994.11
Upon passage of Proposition 184 in November, however, the
voter initiative superseded and immediately replaced the leg-
islative proposal as the law of the state.5 8 Textually, the two
measures are nearly identical, as the legislative measure was
modeled after the Reynolds initiative.59 In spite of the seem-
ingly insignificant differences in the measures, some judges
believe that distinctions exist that could be crucial in deter-
mining what treatment three strikes will receive on appeal.6"
First, the legislative measure added three strikes to the
Penal Code as an addition to a preexisting enhancement stat-
ute, Penal Code section 667.61 As a result, all other provi-
sions of the Penal Code that refer to, define, and limit section
667 would apparently apply to three strikes as well. 62 In con-
trast, the initiative measure allows section 667 to remain un-
changed, and instead adds an entirely new section to the Pe-
nal Code, section 1170.12.63 As an entirely new addition to
the Penal Code, all other provisions of law that had previ-
ously applied to enhancement measures are arguably inappli-
cable to three strikes.64
Second, as a voter initiative, the success of Proposition
184 makes three strikes much more difficult to repeal or mod-
57. Decision '94: Special Guide to California's Elections, supra, note 49, at
wo.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See People v. Reese, No. 94-0714-7, slip op. at 15 (Super. Ct. Contra
Costa County Dec. 21, 1994) (memorandum of decision to strike prior
convictions).
61. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West Supp. 1995). Three strikes adds Penal
Code § 667(b)-(i) to § 667(a). Id. The preexisting enhancement statute,
§ 667(a), provided that any person convicted of a serious felony, who previously
has been convicted of a serious felony, would receive a five year enhancement of
sentence for each prior conviction, in addition to the sentence imposed for the
current offense. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(a) (West 1988).
62. See CALIFORNIA ATTORNEYS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 3 STRIKES: HOW TO
LEAD OFF THE NEXT INNING 18-20 (1994).
63. People v. Reese, No. 94-0714-7, slip op. at 3-4 (Super. Ct. Contra Costa
County Dec. 21, 1994) (memorandum of decision to strike prior convictions).
64. Id. at 15.
1995] 113
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ify. 65 The initiative version of three strikes can only be re-
pealed by initiative of the voters, and can only be modified by
a two-thirds vote of both houses of the legislature. 66 In addi-
tion, any modifications by the legislature that "weakened"
three strikes could be challenged in the courts as not in fur-
therance of the intent of the voters.6 7
C. The Major Provisions of Three Strikes
Although three strikes can be viewed as either an en-
tirely new and alternate sentencing scheme or as an amend-
ment to an existing enhancement statute, the two measures
are nearly identical.6 8 This section describes the major provi-
sions of three strikes, as well as those subjects about which
the statute is silent or vague, but are nonetheless destined to
cause controversy and confusion in the courts.
1. Triple or Life Terms for Three Strike Defendants
Any defendant with two prior serious 69 or violent 70 fel-
ony convictions who is convicted of any third felony is subject
to an automatic sentence of three times the sentence for the
current offense or twenty-five years to life, whichever is
greater.71 The third conviction does not need to be a serious
or violent felony in order to trigger the three strikes sen-
65. Decision '94: Special Guide to California's Elections, supra note 49, at
W10.
66. Id.
67. PETER W. GREENWOOD ET AL., RAND CORP., THREE STRIKES AND YOU'RE
OuT 37 (1994).
68. Id.
69. Three strikes defines a "serious felony" as one of those listed in Penal
Code § 1192.7(c). CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(d)(1) (West Supp. 1995). Serious felo-
nies listed in § 1192.7(c) include: murder or voluntary manslaughter; mayhem;
rape; sodomy by force; oral copulation by force; lewd acts on a minor under 14;
any felony punishable by death or life in prison; any felony in which the defend-
ant inflicts great bodily injury or uses a firearm; attempted murder; assault
with intent to rape or rob; assault with a deadly weapon on a peace officer;
assault by a life prisoner on a non-inmate; assault with a deadly weapon by an
inmate; arson; exploding a destructive device with intent to injure or murder;
burglary of an inhabited dwelling house or trailer coach, or inhabited portion of
any other building; robbery or bank robbery; kidnapping. CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1192.7(c) (West Supp. 1995).
70. Three strikes defines a "violent felony" as one of those listed in Penal
Code § 667.5(c). CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(d)(1) (West Supp. 1995). The violent
felonies listed in § 667.5(c) are essentially the same as those listed in
§ 1192.7(c). See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.5(c) (West Supp. 1995).
71. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1995).
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tence.72 Thus, any felony committed by a person with two
prior strikes will result in at least a twenty-five year sen-
tence, irrespective of the nature of the third felony.73
2. Double Terms for Two Strike Defendants
Any defendant with one prior serious or violent felony
conviction who is convicted of any second felony will receive
double the normal sentence for the current offense. Once
again, the second felony need not be serious or violent; any
second felony conviction will result in double the normal
sentence.74
3. No Washout Period
The length of time between the prior conviction and the
current offense shall not be a factor in imposing a strike sen-
tence.75 In the absence of a washout provision,76 a defendant
with two "stale" prior convictions could receive life in prison
for a third nonviolent felony after twenty years of law abiding
behavior.77
4. No Diversion Programs or County Jail
The sentencing court may not commit strike defendants
to any facility other than state prison. 78 Nonviolent offenders
with a history of drug problems may not be sentenced to drug
rehabilitation.
5. Juvenile Convictions
Certain juvenile convictions can be counted as strikes.
The offense must be serious or violent, and it must have been
committed when the defendant was at least sixteen years
old.80
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. § (e)(1).
75. Id. § (c)(3).
76. A "washout provision" is a statutory provision "that nullifies or 'washes
out' the punishment effect of a prior when defendant has been 'clean' (free of
prison custody and commission of a new felony) for a specified period." Harold
G. Friedman & David H. Rose, Felony Sentencing, in CAuFORNAI CmMINAL LAW
PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE § 37.5 (Anne Harris & Alys Briggs eds., 2d ed. 1994).
77. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(c)(3) (West Supp. 1995).
78. Id. § (c)(4).
79. See id.
80. Id. § (d)(3)(A).
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6. Time Off for Good Behavior
Current law allows most prisoners to receive a 50% re-
duction in sentence for good behavior.81 Three strikes pro-
vides that defendants convicted under strike law may receive
a maximum of only 20% time off for good behavior.8 2
7. No Suspended Sentence or Probation
Three strikes prevents the judge from granting probation
or a suspended sentence for any two or three strike
defendant.83
8. Plea Bargaining
Three strikes provides that the prosecutor shall not use
prior felony convictions, or strikes, in plea bargaining.8 4
9. The Judge's Ability to Strike Prior Convictions
Three strikes allows prosecutors to move to dismiss a
prior felony conviction in the interest of justice, but the court
is not given the same discretion.8 5 The court may only dis-
miss a prior conviction when there is insufficient evidence to
prove the prior conviction.16 As a result, the statute appar-
ently vests the prosecutor with the sole authority to disregard
prior convictions and avert a three strikes sentence.
D. What Three Strikes Leaves Out: The Court's Discretion
to Reduce "Wobblers"
Under the new three strikes legislation, the current or
triggering offense need not be a serious or violent felony.88
Any felony conviction is enough to trigger a two or three
81. CAL. PENAL CODE § 2933(a) (West Supp. 1995). See generally Friedman
& Rose, supra note 76, § 37.60 (describing the various statutory schemes gov-
erning state prison credits).
82. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(c)(5) (West Supp. 1995).
83. Id. § (c)(2).
84. Id. § (g).
85. Id. § (f)(2).
86. Id.
87. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(f)(2) (West Supp. 1995). This provision is con-
sistent with existing law. Penal Code § 1385(a) gives the judge broad authority
to strike prior convictions, or dismiss actions, in the furtherance ofjustice. CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1385(a) (West Supp. 1995). However, § 1385(b) states explicitly
that the statute does not authorize a judge to strike a prior conviction charged
for enhancement purposes pursuant to Penal Code § 667. Id. § 1385(b).
88. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(c) (West Supp. 1995).
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strike sentence when the offender has one or two prior seri-
ous or violent felony convictions.8 9 The law makes no men-
tion, however, of wobblers, 90 and fails to provide any excep-
tion to current law when the current offense is an alternate
felony-misdemeanor crime. The significant number of crimes
that qualify as wobblers, 91 coupled with the magnitude of the
sentence when current law is applied to wobblers in the three
strikes scenario, 92 makes this an issue worthy of special
attention.
1. The Court's Ability to Reduce a Wobbler When the
District Attorney Proceeds by Complaint in the
Municipal Court
When the prosecutor proceeds by filing a complaint 3
charging a wobbler in municipal court, the court retains
89. Id.
90. "A wobbler is a crime that may be punished either as a misdemeanor or
a felony." Friedman & Rose, supra note 76, § 37.60. A felony is a crime punish-
able by death or imprisonment in the state prison. CAL. PENAL CODE § 17(a)
(West Supp. 1995). A misdemeanor is a crime punishable by fine or imprison-
ment in the county jail. Id. § (b).
91. Roughly 140 violations qualify as wobblers, carrying alternate felony-
misdemeanor sentences. CALIFoRNIA DisTRICT ATTORNEY'S ASSOCIATION, UNI-
FORM CRIME CHARGING MANuAL § 601 (1974). Along with a number of obscure
violations such as bribery of a sporting official, grand theft: dog, eavesdropping,
and destruction of telephone lines, some common wobblers include: assault
with a deadly weapon, theft of a credit card, cashing a check with insufficient
funds, receiving stolen property, vandalism, solicitation, petty theft with a prior
conviction of petty theft or felony, and possession of marijuana. Id.
92. For a defendant with two prior strike convictions who is charged with a
wobbler, the determination of whether the current offense is a felony or a mis-
demeanor is literally a life or death matter. See VINCENT SCHIRALDI ET AL.,
CENTER ON JUVENILE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THREE STRIKES: THE UNINTENDED
VICrIMS 25 (1994). If the defendant is convicted of a misdemeanor, he will prob-
ably serve a few months in county jail. Id. If he is convicted of a felony, he faces
twenty-five years in state prison. Id. A brief example illustrates the point:
Thirty-one-year-old Kendall Cooke had two strikes when he was arrested for
the "wobbler" of petty theft with a prior; in Cooke's case, the theft of one can of
beer. Id. Prior to three strikes, Cooke would have faced four to six months in
county jail. Id. Because the District Attorney charged the wobbler as a felony,
Cooke faced twenty-five years in prison. Id. The court reduced the crime to a
misdemeanor and the District Attorney has appealed the reduction. Id.
93. A "complaint" is a pleading, or charging document, filed by the prosecu-
tor in the municipal court alleging felony or misdemeanor offenses. Ruth Spear,
Pleadings; Joinder and Severance, in CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW PROCEDURE
AND PRACTICE, supra note 76, § 7.1. After the complaint is filed, the defendant
is apprised of the charges at the arraignment, and a preliminary hearing is
scheduled in the municipal court. Herbert N.F. Gee & Hon. Judith D. Ford,
Arraignment, in CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE, supra
1995]
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broad discretion to reduce the crime to a misdemeanor.
94 If
the prosecutor charges the crime as a misdemeanor, the wob-
bler is deemed a misdemeanor conviction for all purposes and
does not qualify as a current offense or triggering felony for
strike purposes.95 If the prosecutor charges the wobbler as a
felony, the court has a number of methods at its disposal to
reduce the crime to a misdemeanor.9" First, the court can re-
duce the wobbler by sentencing the crime as a misde-
meanor.9 7 Second, a sentencing judge who wishes to main-
tain some incentive for the offender to comply with the terms
of probation may suspend sentencing, grant probation, and,
at some time later, declare the offense to be a misdemeanor.98
Finally, the court in its discretion may, at or before the pre-
liminary hearing, simply reduce the offense to a misde-
meanor, in which case the crime is considered a misdemeanor
for all purposes. 99 When the defendant is charged by com-
plaint, the prosecutor need not consent to the reduction; a
wobbler can be reduced either on the court's own motion or on
motion of defense counsel. 100
2. The Court's Ability to Reduce a Wobbler When the
District Attorney Proceeds by Indictment
When the prosecutor chooses to bypass municipal court
and charge a wobbler by indictment before a grand jury,10'
note 76, § 6.1. The purpose of the preliminary hearing is to determine if prob-
able cause exists to believe the defendant committed the crime. Grace Lidia
Suarez, Preliminary Hearings, in CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW PROCEDURE AND
PRACTICE, supra note 76, § 22.1. The defendant, represented by counsel, may
cross examine witnesses, call witnesses, and present exculpatory evidence. Id.
If the municipal court finds probable cause, the defendant is "held to answer" or
"bound over" to superior court, where he will stand trial. Id. Charges filed by
complaint in the municipal court should be distinguished from charges filed by
indictment, which bypass both the municipal court and the preliminary hear-
ing. David H. Guthman & Jerrold M. Ladar, Grand Jury, in CALIFORNIA CRIMI-
NAL PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE, supra note 76, § 8.7.
94. CAL. PENAL CODE § 17(b) (West Supp. 1995).
95. Id. § 17(b)(4).
96. Id. § 17(b).
97. Id. § 17(b)(1).
98. Id. § 17(b)(3).
99. CAL. PENAL CODE § 17(b)(4) (West Supp. 1995).
100. Suarez, supra note 93, § 22.40.
101. A grand jury indictment is a method of charging a defendant with a
crime that bypasses the municipal court and the preliminary hearing. Guth-
man & Ladar, supra note 93, § 8.7. When proceeding by indictment, the prose-
cutor presents witnesses and other evidence to a grand jury composed of
[Vol. 36
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the defendant loses the right to a preliminary hearing. 10 2 In
Bowens v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court held
that "[a] defendant indicted in California is no longer entitled
to, and indeed may not be afforded, a post-indictment prelimi-
nary hearing. "103 In addition, the court refused to fashion a
post-indictment "quasi-preliminary hearing," holding that an
indicted defendant "may not receive a post indictment pre-
liminary hearing or any other similar procedure in the courts
of this state."10 4 It remains unclear whether the Bowens pro-
scription on post-indictment preliminary hearings effectively
prevents indicted defendants from moving the court to reduce
a wobbler to a misdemeanor.10 5
nineteen citizens. Id. § 8.1. The purpose of the grand jury is to establish prob-
able cause to believe the defendant committed the crime charged. Id. If twelve
or more jurors find probable cause, the defendant is held for trial in the superior
court. Id. Grand jury proceedings are secret and neither the defendant nor
counsel may be present. Id. § 8.7. The defendant has no opportunity to call
witnesses or present evidence. Id.
102. Bowens v. Superior Court, 820 P.2d 600, 602 (Cal. 1991). The Bowens
proscription on post-indictment preliminary hearings was a response to a prior
California Supreme Court ruling and an initiative of the voters. Id. In 1978,
the court held in Hawkins v. Superior Court that indicted defendants were enti-
tled to a post-indictment preliminary hearing. Hawkins v. Superior Court, 586
P.2d 916 (Cal. 1978). The court noted that to deprive indicted defendants of a
preliminary hearing would be to deprive them of "an impressive array of proce-
dural rights" afforded defendants charged by complaint; among them, the right
to present and cross examine witnesses, and present exculpatory evidence. Id.
at 918.
In 1990, the voters of California passed Proposition 115, which amended
the California Constitution to read, "[i]f a felony is prosecuted by indictment,
there shall be no post indictment preliminary hearing." CAL. CONST. art. I,
§ 14.1.
In Bowens, the defendant sought a "quasi-preliminary" hearing to deter-
mine probable cause; thus, the court had no opportunity to consider the defend-
ant's right to move for a § 17(b) reduction of a wobbler to a misdemeanor.
Bowens v. Superior Court, 820 P.2d 600, 606 (Cal. 1991). Faced with the obvi-
ous tension between Hawkins and the constitutional proscription on post-in-
dictment preliminary hearings, the Bowens court overruled Hawkins and pro-
hibited post-indictment preliminary hearings and quasi-preliminary hearings.
Id. at 609.
103. Bowens, 820 P.2d at 602.
104. Id. at 609.
105. See discussion infra part IV.F.1.
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3. The Prosecutorial Response to the Disparate
Treatment of Wobblers
Given the prosecutor's broad discretion in charging,1"6
and the ease with which district attorneys can avoid section
17(b) reductions in municipal court, 10 7 it is not surprising
that some district attorneys have chosen to make exclusive
use of grand jury indictments in charging three strikes
cases.1 0 8 If the district attorney charges by complaint in the
municipal court, the defendant has the opportunity to per-
suade the court that, based on the particular facts of the case,
a reduction is warranted. 10 9 By charging three strike defend-
ants exclusively by indictment, the prosecutor avoids the pre-
liminary hearing and even the possibility of a section 17(b)
reduction in the municipal court." 0
E. The Early Attempts by Trial Courts to Interpret Three
Strikes
This section examines how local trial courts have at-
tempted to resolve some of the problems created by the new
three strikes law,"1 focusing specifically on two issues that
have caused considerable controversy and confusion in trial
courts. First, this section discusses the court's authority to
reduce a wobbler from a felony to a misdemeanor in the ab-
sence of a preliminary hearing. 1 2 Next is an examination of
the decision of a Contra Costa County judge that the court
106. Spear, supra note 93, § 7.12. Among other things, the district attorney
decides whether to charge at all, charge prior convictions, charge by grand jury
indictment, and charge wobblers as misdemeanors or felonies. Id.
107. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
108. Sandra Gonzales, Law Could Load Courts, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS,
May 9, 1994, at B1P; Bill Kisliuk, Santa Clara DA Using Grand Jury to Move 3
Strikes Cases Quickly, THE RECORDER, May 24, 1994, at 1.
109. See supra notes 93-100 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 101-05 and accompanying text.
111. To date, no California appellate court has published a decision on three
strikes. The two cases examined in this comment are unpublished superior
court cases, and are not presented as binding on other courts. Rather, these
cases are analyzed because they deal with two of the issues that have caused
the most controversy in trial courts since three strikes was enacted. In addi-
tion, these cases present solutions to the three strikes dilemma that could have
some influence on how higher courts respond to the new law. Finally, the con-
tortions of trial courts faced with the unenviable task of applying three strikes
illustrate some of the problems with the law.
112. See discussion infra part II.E.1.
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retains the authority to strike prior convictions in the inter-
est of justice. 1 13
1. People v. Miller: The Possibility of a Post-
Indictment Section 17(b) Reduction
In People v. Miller, the court struggled with the viability
of section 17(b) wobbler reductions in the wake of Bowens and
three strikes. 114 A number of defendants who faced two and
three strike sentences, and who had been charged by indict-
ment, moved the superior court for a post-indictment deter-
mination of whether a section 17(b) reduction was warranted
based on the facts and circumstances of their respective
cases. 5 After reviewing Hawkins and Bowens, 1 6 Judge Ma-
noukian concluded that an indicted defendant is not entitled
to a post-indictment preliminary hearing or to a probable
cause hearing that closely resembles a preliminary
hearing.1 17
In spite of this apparent proscription of post-indictment
hearings, the court concluded that "the prohibition of post-
indictment preliminary hearings does not necessarily pre-
clude a judicial determination of whether a 'wobbler' offense
is a misdemeanor or a felony.""18 The court based its decision
largely on the holding of People v. Municipal Court (Kong)," 9
in which the court held that a magistrate presiding over a
post-indictment preliminary hearing retained the section
17(b) authority to reduce a wobbler to a misdemeanor. 20 The
Miller court observed that, although Bowens had eliminated
the post-indictment preliminary hearing, the Kong holding is
still valid "to the extent that it authorizes a section 17(b) re-
duction after an indictment."' 2 1 Thus, although an indicted
113. See discussion infra part II.E.2.
114. People v. Miller, No. 171-325, slip op. at 4 (Super. Ct. Santa Clara
County June 14, 1994) (order on motion for post-indictment hearing to consider
§ 17(b)(5) reduction).
115. Id. at 3.
116. Id. at 4-8.
117. Id. at 8.
118. Id. at 9.
119. 175 Cal. Rptr. 861 (1981).
120. Kong, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 864.
121. People v. Miller, No. 171-325, slip op. at 11 (Super. Ct. Santa Clara
County June 14, 1994) (order on motion for post-indictment hearing to consider
§ 17(b)(5) reduction). The court noted that Kong has been cited 13 times by
appellate courts, and once since the passage of Proposition 115. Id.
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defendant is not entitled to a preliminary hearing nor to any
other procedure closely resembling a preliminary hearing, he
is entitled to some kind of judicial determination of whether
the particular facts of his case warrant a reduction of his fel-
ony-wobbler to a misdemeanor.
122
Miller based the requirement of such a determination on
both equal protection and separation of powers grounds.
123
In short, to deny indicted defendants a section 17(b) reduc-
tion hearing would be to deny them a significant opportunity
afforded defendants charged by complaint. It would also
deny the court its authority to reduce a wobbler to a misde-
meanor, instead vesting the prosecutor with "the sole author-
ity to determine the status of a wobbler.'
24
Finally, Miller argued that a judicial determination of
whether a wobbler should be reduced would not require a for-
mal hearing or any other "quasi-preliminary hearing" pro-
scribed by Bowens.125 A superior court could simply base its
decision regarding the reduction of a wobbler on evidence
presented to the grand jury or developed after discovery, in
addition to a favorable or unfavorable probation report.
126
2. People v. Reese: The Court's Authority to Strike
Prior Convictions
In People v. Reese, the Contra Costa County Superior
Court considered a judge's authority to strike prior convic-
tions in the wake of three strikes. 12 7 The people argued that
because section 1385 explicitly prevented the court from
striking a prior conviction for section 667 enhancement pur-
poses,'12 it clearly applied to three strikes, which, in legisla-
tive form, is an amendment to section 667.129 In spite of lan-
guage in three strikes that appears to allow only the
prosecutor to strike prior convictions in the interest of jus-
122. Id. at 9-10.
123. Id. at 13-15.
124. Id. at 15.
125. Id. at 15-16.
126. People v. Miller, No. 171-325, slip op. at 16-17 (Super. Ct. Santa Clara
County June 14, 1994) (order on motion for post-indictment hearing to consider
§ 17(b)(5) reduction).
127. People v. Reese, No. 94-0714-7, slip op. at 3 (Super. Ct. Contra Costa
County Dec. 21, 1994) (memorandum of decision to strike prior convictions).
128. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
129. People v. Reese, No. 94-0714-7, slip op. at 18 (Super. Ct. Contra Costa
County Dec. 21, 1994) (memorandum of decision to strike prior convictions).
[Vol. 36
THREE STRIKES DILEMMA
tice,13 0 and in spite of the explicit bar to judicial discretion
contained in section 1385,'1' Judge Arnason held that the
court retained the authority to strike prior convictions.' 32
The court began by establishing the applicable law. 133
Although the initiative and statutory versions of three strikes
are textually virtually identical, only one version can serve as
the law of the state. 134 After reviewing the intent of the vot-
ers in passing the initiative, 13 5 the court concluded that the
initiative version is the only applicable law. 136 According to
Judge Arnason, the voters were asked in Proposition 184 to
either accept the legislative version by voting no, or to replace
the legislative measure with the initiative version by voting
yes.' 37 The passage of Proposition 184 sealed the initiative
version as the law of the state and added section 1170.12 to
the Penal Code.' 31
Having established the relevant law, the court turned to
the application of section 1385 to the initiative version.13 9
First, Judge Arnason established that the court's section
1385 authority to dismiss an action is absolute except where
130. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(f)(2) (West Supp. 1995). Section (f)(2) provides:
The prosecuting attorney may move to dismiss or strike a prior felony
conviction allegation in the furtherance of justice pursuant to Section
1385, or if there is insufficient evidence to prove the prior conviction. If
upon the satisfaction of the court that there is insufficient evidence to
prove the prior felony conviction, the court may dismiss or strike the
allegation.
Id.
131. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
132. People v. Reese, No. 94-0714-7, slip op. at 20-21 (Super. Ct. Contra
Costa County Dec. 21, 1994) (memorandum of decision to strike prior
convictions).
133. Id. at 3.
134. Id. at 15 ("To paraphrase Hermann Melville: There was but one captain
of the Pequod, Ahab; and now there is but one version of the three strike law,
the people's version.").
135. Id. at 5-15. The court found the initiative and statutory versions of
three strikes to be "competing" rather than "complimentary" measures, in spite
of what the court called "very similar language." Id. at 15. Generally, when
two initiative measures compete, the initiative receiving the most votes be-
comes the law of the state; when two measures are complimentary, courts will
attempt to synthesize the similar or identical provisions to create a hybrid mea-
sure. Id. Because three strikes involves a statutory and initiative measure,
rather than two initiative measures, the analysis is speculative. Id.
136. Id. at 15.
137. People v. Reese, No. 94-0714-7, slip op. at 10 (Super. Ct. Contra Costa
County Dec. 21, 1994) (memorandum of decision to strike prior convictions).
138. Id. at 15.
139. Id.
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the legislature has explicitly limited the power. 140 Second,
the court noted that section 1385 explicitly bars only the
court's authority to strike section 667 prior convictions."'
Because section 1170.12, rather than section 667, is the ap-
plicable three strikes law of the state, the section 1385 bar on
judicial discretion to strike priors is inapplicable to three
strikes law. 14 2 Finally, the court stated that section 1170.12
contains no explicit language limiting the court's section 1385
authority. 14 3 Thus, the court held that "the initiative version
of the three strike law was not intended to, nor can its plain
language be construed to, abrogate or otherwise eliminate the
court's 'well established statutory authority' to strike a prior
conviction in furtherance of justice."144
III. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Three strikes is the result of an understandable and
well-founded public reaction to a soaring violent crime rate
14 5
and a well-publicized tradgedy. This comment does not ques-
tion the sound judgment of the voters in passing three
strikes,146 or argue that it is in any way unjust, cruel, or
counter-productive to imprison violent career criminals for
life. 147 Rather, this comment addresses the three strikes di-
lemma by answering three questions. First, will three strikes
reduce violent crime? Second, what will be the "cost" of three
140. Id. at 16.
141. Id. at 17.
142. See People v. Reese, No. 94-0714-7, slip op. at 17 (Super. Ct. Contra
Costa County Dec. 21, 1994) (memorandum of decision to strike prior
convictions).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 20-21.
145. From 1966 to 1990, the rate of violent crime in the U.S. quadrupled.
Ernest Van Den Haag, How to Cut Crime, NAT'L REV., May 30, 1994, at 30.
Although crime rates have dropped 4% in the last few years, there is currently
one homicide every 42 seconds, one burglary every 11 seconds, one car theft
every 20 seconds, one robbery every 40 seconds, and one reported rape every 5
minutes. Id.
146. This comment will abide by the wisdom of the commentator who ad-
vised that we "not fall prey to the elitist argument that the people do not know
what is best for them and therefore need someone else to tell them." Donald S.
Greenberg, The Scope of the Initiative and Referendum in California, 54 CAL. L.
REv. 1717, 1747 (1966).
147. But see PETER W. GREENWOOD, RAND CORP., SELECTIVE INCAPACITA-
TION REVISITED (1987); NIGEL WALKER, WHY PUNISH? (1991); Markus D. Dub-
ber, The Unprincipled Punishment of Repeat Offenders, 43 STA. L. REv. 193
(1990).
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strikes to the state budget and the integrity of the justice sys-
tem? Finally, how can three strikes be modified to retain
those provisions of the bill that add to its effectiveness in
fighting crime, while eliminating those provisions that lead to
enormous expense and the erosion of the integrity of the
criminal justice system?
IV. ANALYsis
This analysis begins with a discussion of the substantial
effect three strikes will have in reducing violent crime. 148 Af-
ter discussing the benefits of three strikes, this analysis ex-
amines the cost of the law,149 its overly broad scope,150 the
pressure it will place on the criminal justice system, 151 and
the net result it will likely have on the courts, attorneys, and
judges.152 Finally, this section examines the efficacy of the
early trial courts' solutions to the three strikes dilemma. 5 8
A. Three Strikes Will Reduce Violent Crime
The author of the three strikes initiative, Mike Reynolds,
described the philosophy behind the initiative:
The philosophy is a real simple one. About 75 percent of
violent felonies are committed by about 6 percent of the
felons, and they are usually between 15 and 24 years of
age. After that, they rarely are a threat to society. What
we are trying to do is keep those people in jail at least
until they are 40.15
The philosophy is, indeed, quite simple. By imprisoning
career criminals until they reach the age when continued vio-
lent crime becomes unlikely, fewer career criminals will be
free to prey on the public, resulting in an overall reduction in
crime. 15 5 Notwithstanding the excessive cost of three strikes
and the arguably overly broad scope of the bill, 156 there is
considerable scholarly and statistical support for the effec-
148. See discussion infra part V.A.
149. See discussion infra part W.B.
150. See discussion infra part W.C.
151. See discussion infra part 1V.D.
152. See discussion infra part V.E.
153. See discussion infra part V.F.
154. Kushman, supra note 34, at Al.
155. See id.
156. See discussion infra part W.B-C.
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tiveness of the simple three strikes philosophy in reducing
crime.
Numerous studies show that a small number of habitual
offenders commit the majority of violent crimes. 157 In addi-
tion, the evidence suggests that those states with the highest
incarceration rates experience commensurate reductions in
crime. 158 Finally, many sociologists and criminologists agree
that age itself is a determinative factor in violent criminal
behavior, and that the propensity to commit violent crime de-
creases dramatically after age forty-five.' 59 Criminologists,
sociologists, attorneys, and judges disagree bitterly over
these issues, 160 and it is not the purpose of this comment to
resolve the debate. It should suffice for the purposes of this
comment to point out that two recent and comprehensive
157. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, RE-
CIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1983, at 3 (1989) (demonstrating that a
small group of repeat offenders commit a large percentage of violent crimes);
Gross, supra note 10, at 1 ("There is a broad consensus among criminologists
that a small percentage of repeat offenders are responsible for the vast majority
of violent crime."); cf. JOAN PETERSILIA ET AL., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
CRIMINAL CAREERS OF HABITUAL FELONS (1978) (examining the criminal careers
of 49 felons using the case study method).
158. 8 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, THE CASE FOR MORE INCARCERATION 4-5
(1992).
159. See RUDY A. HAAPANEN, SELECTIVE INCAPACITATION AND THE SERIOUS
OFFENDER 45-58 (1990) (presenting data demonstrating that the propensity to
commit violent crime plummets as the individual ages); JAMES Q. WILSON,
CRIME AND HUMAN NATURE 126-47 (1985) (arguing that criminal behavior de-
pends more on age than on any other demographic characteristic); Van Den
Haag, supra note 145, at 35 ("While prison programs seldom rehabilitate, age
nearly always does. Over half of all offenders sent to prison are under age 29.
Only about 4 percent are over age 45.").
160. Compare Lois G. FoRER, A RAGE TO PUNISH: THE UNINTENDED CONSE-
QUENCES OF MANDATORY SENTENCING (1994) (arguing that increased incarcera-
tion is ineffective in reducing crime and grossly unjust) with Van Den Haag,
supra note 145, at 30 (arguing that increased incarceration and greater applica-
tion of the death penalty is the only solution to a rising crime rate).
Some commentators believe that three strikes will increase the incentive
for career criminals to kill their victims. William Tucker, Three Strikes and
You're Dead, AM. SPECTATOR, Mar. 1994, at 22. The author notes that the aver-
age convicted murderer in the U.S. serves eleven years in prison, while the av-
erage convicted rapist serves five years. Id. As "get tough" laws increase
sentences for non-murderers, they blur the distinction between violent crime
and homicide, increasing the incentive for the career criminal to kill the victim.
Id. at 24. The logic is as follows: If a felon with two strikes commits rape or
robbery, he will be sentenced under the three strikes law to life in prison; if he
kills the victim to prevent the victim from identifying him, he will still receive
life in prison. Id. The author's solution, once again, is to "raise the stakes" of
homicide, through greater application of the death penalty. Id.
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studies support both the philosophy behind the law and its
ultimate effectiveness in reducing violent crime.
A very recent study of three strikes conducted by the
Santa Clara County Center for Urban Analysis supports the
proposition that a relatively small number of career criminals
are responsible for a disproportionate number of serious
crimes. 16 1 The study found that the 8395 persons sentenced
on felony matters in Santa Clara County in 1992 had, be-
tween them, a total of 11,715 prior felony convictions.
162 Of
this group, 4880, or 58%, had no prior felony convictions.
163
In contrast to this large group of defendants with no serious
criminal history, 1090 defendants, or 13%, accounted for
7180, or 61%, of the 11,715 prior felony convictions.1
6 4 Of
these 1090 serious criminals, 75% would have been sentenced
under the three strikes law if it had been in effect in 1992.165
Another study supports both the philosophy behind three
strikes and the ultimate effectiveness of the law in reducing
serious crime. A 1994 RAND Corporation study of three
strikes classified criminals as either "high-rate" or "low-rate"
offenders.166 The study concluded that high-rate offenders
commit "almost eighteen times as many crimes as low-rate
offenders," and that "the typical high-rate offender commits
seven serious crimes per year, including two violent
crimes." 67 In addition, the study supports proponents'
claims that three strikes will significantly reduce violent
crime. Ultimately, the RAND study estimates that three
strikes will reduce the annual number of serious crimes in
California by 28% over the next twenty-five years.
168
The three strikes concept is a simple and long-overdue
solution to an appalling crime rate. 69 By identifying career
criminals and incarcerating them until they are no longer
161. SANTA CLARA COUNTY OFFICE OF THE COUNTY EXECUTIVE, CENTER FOR
URBAN ANALYSIS, ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF AR 971 "THREE STRIKES, YOU'RE
OUT" ON THE JUSTICE SYSTEM IN SANTA CLARA COUNTY CALIFORNIA 14 (Aug. 10,
1994) [hereinafter SANTA CLARA STUDY] (on file with the Santa Clara Center for
Urban Analysis).
162. Id. at 8.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 14.
165. Id.
166. GREENWOOD ET AL., supra note 67, at 17.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 18.
169. See supra note 145.
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likely to commit violent crimes, the crime rate will be reduced
and tragedies like the Polly Klaas incident can be prevented.
The RAND study supports this simple solution, but also
points out the policy dilemma of three strikes: while simply
locking up more criminals will reduce the crime rate, what
will be the ultimate cost to the criminal justice system and
taxpayers? 170
B. The Cost of Three Strikes
Estimates of the cost of three strikes are rough due to the
multitude of factors that must be considered in such a com-
plex equation. 171 It is certain, for instance, that the state will
require more prison space, prosecutors, public defenders, and
corrections officers.172 It is less clear, however, what savings
might result by slowing the revolving door of criminal justice
and thereby eliminating the cost of continually arresting,
processing, and incarcerating the same felons. 173 The RAND
study concludes that three strikes will cost Californians an
additional $5.5 billion annually, or about $16,000 per serious
crime prevented.' 74 A brief examination of the 1994 distribu-
tion of California's general fund appropriations helps put this
cost in perspective.
In 1994, prior to the passage of three strikes, state
spending was allocated as follows: 36% for K-12 education,
35% for health and welfare, 12% for higher education, 9% for
miscellaneous services such as pollution control and work-
place safety, and 9% for corrections. 7 5 By the year 2002, the
$5.5 billion price tag of three strikes will have doubled correc-
tions costs to 18% of the state budget, requiring either a com-
mensurate 9% reduction in spending in another area, a new
bond issue to finance three strikes, or a tax increase of at
least $300 per year for the average taxpayer. 76 The options
170. GREENWOOD ET AL., supra note 67, at 14.
171. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, 1993-94 REGULAR SESS., STAFF
MATERIALS ON THREE STRIKES 10 (Feb. 17, 1994). The Senate Committee notes
that the ultimate impact of three strikes on future budgets is unknown. Id.
172. Id. at 11.
173. Id.
174. GREENWOOD gr AL., supra note 67, at 18. The study also projects that
paying for three strikes would require a tax increase of at least $300 per year
from the average taxpayer. Id. at 32.
175. Id. at 32-34.
176. Id.
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for paying for three strikes are therefore threefold. First, the
Legislature and Governor could raise taxes, an unlikely prop-
osition given the current political climate. 177 Second, the
state could issue bonds in order to borrow the money, an
equally unpopular scenario.' 7 The third, and final, option is
to cut one of the other four areas of general spending: pri-
mary education, health and welfare, higher education, or
miscellaneous services.
179
Spending cuts cannot come from primary education be-
cause the California Constitution sets minimum levels of
funding for primary education. 80 Moreover, because school
enrollment will increase between 1994 and 2002, the percent-
age of the budget devoted to primary education is expected to
increase from 36% to 47%.181 Spending cuts in health and
welfare are equally unlikely as this portion of the budget has
been growing for the past twenty-five years.18 2 Thus, if three
strikes is implemented without a tax increase or bond issue,
by the year 2002 the state will be spending 46% of its general
fund on primary education, 35% on health and welfare, and
18% on corrections, leaving a virtually nonexistent 1% for the
combined higher education and miscellaneous services that
now consume 21% of the state budget.1
8 3
Although voters are assumed to know the law and under-
stand the likely result of their vote,18 4 it is unlikely that the
average citizen who voted in favor of three strikes understood
the law's grave financial impact. While the occasional voter
177. In fact, the Governor has recently proposed a 15% tax cut for businesses
and individuals. Robert B. Gunnison, Wilson Urges Tax Cut, Welfare Reform,
S.F. CHRON., Jan. 10, 1995, at Al. The Governor also called for the construction
of six new prisons to house three strikes inmates. Id. at A13.
178. The Governor has proposed a $2 billion prison bond measure, but has
been unable to win the support of Senate Republicans. Daniel Weintraub, Wil-
son's Budget Slashes Welfare, Backs New Prisons, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1994, at
Al. In 1990, 12 of 14 bond proposals were rejected by voters, including meas-
ures to expand college campuses and construct prisons. Virginia Ellis, Califor-
nia Elections, L.A. TIMES, May 31, 1994, at A3.
179. Gunnison, supra note 177, at A13.
180. GREENWOOD ET AL., supra note 67, at 33.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 35, fig. 5.2.
184. See Taxpayers to Limit Campaign Spending v. Fair Pol. Practices
Comm'n, 799 P.2d 1220, 1235 (Cal. 1990) ("[Tjhis court must on occasion in-
dulge in a presumption that the voters thoroughly study and understand the
content of complex initiative measures.").
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may have been aware that the law would cost $5.5 billion an-
nually, the figure is meaningless unless placed in the context
of the overall state budget and juxtaposed against the pro-
grams that must be reduced or eliminated in order to afford
the law. In addition, it is unlikely that voters were aware
that paying the three strikes price tag would require either
the total elimination of state funding for higher education or
a tax increase or bond issue amounting to approximately
$300 per taxpayer each year. While voters were certainly in
favor of tougher penalties for career criminals, it stretches
the limits of imagination to suggest that the voters who
passed three strikes were consenting to a tax increase or the
elimination of the state university system. Before state poli-
ticians consider either of these difficult options, they have a
responsibility to modify the scope of the law so that lengthy
and expensive life sentences are imposed on only those dan-
gerous and violent felons for whom the law was designed.
C. The Scope of the Bill
Perhaps the greatest problem with three strikes stems
from the overly broad scope of the law. Three strikes simply
casts too wide a net, increasing both the expense of the law
and the pressure on the criminal justice system by imprison-
ing essentially non-violent felons for twenty-five years.
1. Any Third Felony Triggers a Three Strike Sentence
Three strikes fails to make any distinction between vio-
lent and relatively innocuous offenders. The law provides
that a felon with two qualifying prior felony convictions will
be sentenced to twenty-five years to life for any third felony,
irrespective of the nature of the third offense.18 5 A felon with
two prior convictions who commits the crime of "petty theft
with a prior" could automatically receive a three strike sen-
tence of twenty-five years to life in spite of the fact that he
may never have committed a violent crime.'8 6 The following
is an example from the Senate Committee Report on three
185. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
186. See, e.g., SCHIALDI ET AL., supra note 92. The authors examine the
criminal careers of ten defendants facing three strikes sentences. Id. Many of
the defendants have never committed a violent crime, and most received their
third strike for a minor offense. Id.
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strikes which illustrates the sometimes inequitable results of
this provision:
[A] person who was convicted of breaking into a neighbor's
attached garage on two occasions in order to steal a bicy-
cle, and who was placed on probation for the offenses,
would have two serious prior offenses. Any third felony,
such as theft of $400 worth of property, would result in a
life term under the provisions of this bill, regardless of
whether he had ever acted violently or dangerously."8 7
There are situations in which the "any third felony" pro-
vision makes sense. For example, an offender with two par-
ticularly violent prior convictions who commits assault with a
deadly weapon shortly after being released from prison
should receive a life sentence. It would be proper and reason-
able in such a situation for the court to consider the defend-
ant's history of violence and other aggravating factors, and, if
there appears to be a threat to the community, impose a three
strike sentence. Yet certainly there are differences between
the two defendants; the first has committed relatively minor
property offenses, while the second has committed two vio-
lent felonies and is apparently willing to engage in further
acts of violence. The problem with three strikes is that the
law forces the court to ignore the obvious differences between
the two defendants and sentence both to life in prison at a
cost of about $21,000 per prisoner per year.'88
2. The No Washout Provision Ignores Law Abiding
Behavior
The second provision of three strikes that dramatically
increases the scope of the bill is the absence of a washout pe-
riod.'8 9 This provision forces a sentencing judge to ignore the
particular circumstances of each defendant's life and impose
a strike sentence without considering even lengthy periods of
law abiding behavior. 190 As a result, an offender with two
prior convictions that are twenty years old could receive a
three strike sentence for a minor third felony in spite of
187. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, 1993-94 REGULAR SESS., STAFF
MATERIALS ON THREE STRIKES 4 (Feb. 17, 1994).
188. PHILIP G. ZIMBARDO, CENTER ON JUVENILE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
TRANSFORMING CALIFORNIA'S PRISONS INTO ExPENsIVE OLD AGE HOMES FOR
FELONS 5 (1994).
189. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
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twenty years of law abiding behavior. In addition to violating
the most basic principles of fairness, this provision of three
strikes is bound to significantly increase its cost.
The absence of a washout period violates fundamental
principles of justice by preventing the sentencing judge from
exercising any discretion in the imposition of life sentences.
It is a basic principle of sentencing in California that the cir-
cumstances surrounding a crime do matter, and should be
considered by the trial judge in sentencing. 191 In the three
strikes scenario, a sentencing judge is required to ignore im-
portant questions about the defendant's life since the last of-
fense: How much time has passed since the offender commit-
ted his last crime? How old is the defendant and does his age
make future serious offenses unlikely? Has the defendant
managed to hold a job and support a family since his last con-
viction? Was the current offense a serious or violent felony,
or a relatively minor offense such as passing a bad check or
petty theft? The average citizen would certainly consider
these important questions before imposing a life sentence on
a nonviolent offender whose third strike occured after years
of responsible behavior. It is both unjust and fiscally irre-
sponsible to deny the court the authority to consider the same
questions.
In addition to violating principles of fairness, the no
washout provision will greatly increase the cost of three
strikes. Many of the offenders unfairly imprisoned by the no
washout provision will be older offenders who no longer pose
a serious threat to society, but do require a great deal of
costly medical care. 19 2 While the cost of incarcerating a
younger offender in state prison for one year is about $21,000,
the figure rises to $60,000 per year for inmates over fifty
years of age, and $69,000 per year for inmates over sixty.
193
Given the fact that age greatly reduces the propensity to com-
mit violent crime,19 4 it is hard to justify the enormous ex-
pense of a life sentence for a senior citizen who commits a
minor property offense after years of law abiding behavior. A
flexible and discretionary washout provision in the three
191. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(b) (West Supp. 1995); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1204
(West 1982).
192. See ZIMBARDO, supra note 188, at 1-3.
193. Id. at 3.
194. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
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strikes law would allow judges to spare such defendants life
in prison, and spare taxpayers the cost of turning California's
prisons into "expensive old age homes for felons."195
3. Many Nonviolent Offenders Will be Subject to Strike
Sentences
Given the broad scope of three strikes, it is not surprising
that many essentially nonviolent offenders will be subject to
two and three strike sentences. 196 One report suggests that
75% of defendants eligible for life sentences will receive their
third strike for a minor felony such as drug possession or ve-
hicle theft.197 While many truly violent criminals will receive
well deserved life sentences, there is a litany of nonviolent
offenders, often drug addicts, who have been caught in the
three strikes net.198 A case in point is that of Clarence Marl-
borough, a forty-eight year old man who could receive his
third strike for stealing $80 worth of batteries from a conven-
ience store. 199 Marlborough is a drug addict who commits
petty theft to support his drug habit and has no serious his-
tory of violence. If convicted under three strikes, he will re-
ceive life in prison at a cost to taxpayers of over
$1,000,000.200
In the absence of fiscal concerns, incarcerating such of-
fenders for life raises serious questions about whether the
punishment fits the crime. But when the $21,000 to $69,000
per year cost of incarcerating these nonviolent offenders is
also taken into account,21 it becomes difficult to dispute the
charge that "three strikes is not simply draconian, it is dan-
gerous folly."20 2
D. Pressure on the System: The Santa Clara Study
In addition to the financial ramifications of three strikes,
the broad scope of the law will otherwise put tremendous
strain on an already overburdened criminal justice system.
195. ZIMBARDO, supra note 188, at 1.
196. See SCHIRALDI ET AL., supra note 92, at 1-4.
197. GREENWOOD ET AL., supra note 67, at xii.
198. See generally SCHmALDI ET AL., supra note 92.
199. Id. at 10-14.
200. Id.
201. See supra note 192-93 and accompanying text.
202. Vote No on 184: Three Strikes and We're Broke, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 9,
1994, at P1.
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Immediately upon passage of three strikes, criminal justice
insiders recognized that a flood of two and three strike cases
could simply overwhelm the courts.2 °3 Defendants are un-
likely to plead guilty to a three strike sentence, and the law's
ban on plea bargaining20 4 leaves a defendant with no incen-
tive to do so. With nothing to lose, two and three strike de-
fendants will exercise their constitutional right to trial by
jury in a record number of cases. Although there has been no
comprehensive statewide study of the likely effects of three
strikes on the justice system, a study of the initiative in
Santa Clara County provides at least a glimpse of what can
be expected statewide.
In anticipation of various challenges created by three
strikes, the Santa Clara County Center for Urban Analysis
undertook a study of the likely impact of the law on the Santa
Clara County criminal justice system.20 5 The results reveal
that, as anticipated, three strikes will put unprecedented
pressure on the system. If 1994 is similar to 1992, roughly
8400 persons will be sentenced on felony matters in Santa
Clara County, and about 2315, or 28%, will be strike cases.206
The number of jury trials required to accommodate these
strike cases will increase by 193% from 200 to 585.207 These
385 additional jury trials will require an additional 8740
court hearings, an increase of 85%.211
Although these figures are only estimates of the long
term effect of three strikes, Santa Clara and other counties
began to feel the pressure of the new law almost immediately.
San Francisco Superior Court recently began sending crimi-
nal cases to civil departments, and the San Francisco District
Attorney estimates that criminal cases could soon swallow
three of the city's twenty civil departments. 20 9 Given the tre-
203. SANTA CLARA STUDY, supra note 161, at vi.
204. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. The author of the Santa
Clara Study, Bob Cushman, observed "[t]he public perception is that all these
offenders are getting a Perry Mason-like trial, and they're not. The system is
dependent on guilty pleas." Gonzales, supra note 108, at B1P.
205. SANTA CLARA STUDY, supra note 161, at vi.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Bill Kisliuk, Three Strikes and You've Got an Overflowing Criminal
Docket, THE RECORDER, Nov. 15, 1994, at 2. See generally Candace McCoy,
From Sociological Trends of 1992 to the Criminal Courts of 2020, 66 S. CAL. L.
REv. 1967 (1993). The author argues that, irrespective of three strikes, various
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mendous stress three strikes places on an already
overburdened criminal justice system, it is prudent to ex-
amine how the system will respond to the increased pressure.
E. The Net Result: The Integrity of the System
Taken in concert, the expense of three strikes,2 1 ° the
broad scope of the law, 211 and the pressure it places on the
judicial system212 are likely to result in an erosion of the in-
tegrity of the criminal justice system. Defense attorneys will
advise their clients to exercise their right to a speedy trial
within sixty days. The district attorney's office will not have
enough prosecutors to try the onslaught of strike cases.21 3
Judges will be faced with the exception to the rule, the de-
fendant facing a three strike sentence who has never commit-
ted a violent crime, is not a threat to society, and certainly
does not deserve life in prison. Finally, some victims of third
or "triggering" felonies may refuse to press charges if they are
aware that doing so may result in life in prison for the of-
fender.21 4 According to Supreme Court Justice Stephen
Breyer, the justice system will adapt to such a situation be-
cause, in his words, there is always "oil in the joints" of the
sociological factors will greatly increase the pressure on the criminal justice
system over the course of the next three decades. Id. at 1967. These factors
include increased immigration, continued availability and use of firearms, and
an even greater number of non-English-speaking victims and defendants. Id.
The author proposes mediation and alternative dispute resolution in criminal
cases involving misdemeanors and felony wobblers. Id. at 1990.
210. See discussion supra part IV.B.
211. See discussion supra part IV.C.
212. See discussion supra part IV.D.
213. The Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors recently voted to spend
$1.3 million to hire additional lawyers and court staff to handle three strike
cases. More Lawyers for Santa Clara DA, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 1, 1994, at A14.
214. In a truly ironic episode, a San Francisco woman named Joan Miller
became one of the first victims to refuse to testify against a three strikes de-
fendant. Joan Miller's car was broken into by a felon with two prior strikes,
making the felon eligible for a three strikes sentence of life in prison. Jim
Zamora, Three Strikes Entangles S.F. Woman Twice, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 24,
1994, at Al. Three hours later, Joan Miller's son, Jed Miller, the named defend-
ant in the case of People v. Miller discussed in this comment, was arrested for
using a stolen truck to steal bicycles at Stanford University. Id. Jed Miller has
a number of prior convictions and faces a three strikes sentence. Joan Miller
refused to testify against the man who tried to steal her car, and he plead guilty
to second-degree burglary, receiving four years in prison rather than life. Id.
Jed Miller has taken up the rhetorical fight against three strikes from his
prison cell, writing op-ed pieces about the injustice of the law. See, e.g., Jed
Miller, Three Strikes and I'm Out, S.F. EXAMINER, Oct. 2, 1994, at A13.
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criminal justice system. 21 5 The oil in the joints of the justice
system will allow it to respond to the cost, pressure, and
scope of three strikes, but the response will be far from what
the voters anticipated in passing three strikes.21
First, prosecutors will respond by not charging or under-
charging certain defendants.21 7 Wobblers that should proba-
bly be charged as felonies will be charged as misdemeanors to
avoid a three strike jury trial. Prosecutors will be forced to
strike the prior convictions of two and three strike defendants
who the public would expect to receive, and who may well de-
serve, enhanced three strike sentences. Finally, the plea bar-
gaining that three strikes ostensibly prohibits is likely to oc-
cur nonetheless, through some procedure that quietly
circumvents the intent of the law.21 8
215. Judge Stephen Breyer, Dump Mandatory Minimums, Address Before
the American Bar Association (Aug. 7, 1993) in N.J. LAW J., May 30, 1994, at
17. Judge Breyer criticized mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, arguing
that the justice system will respond in unanticipated ways when the law re-
quires the imposition of harsh mandatory sentences on undeserving defend-
ants. Id. According to Judge Breyer:
mou cannot tell human beings to do things that they feel are totally
unfair, and if you tell judges or lawyers or prosecutors who are human
beings to do something they think is terrible, they won't do it. They'll
figure a way out. And my goodness, I mean there is oil in the joints of
the criminal law, always oil in the joints.
Id.
Judge Breyer argued that when faced with the defendant who deserves le-
niency, the prosecutor won't charge, the jury won't convict, or the judge will
reduce the sentence. Id.
216. According to another commentator, "of course, [three strikes] won't be
enforced as written, because such irrational mandates will always be circum-
vented through plea bargaining and other stratagems to avert complete col-
lapse of the system. But the effect would still be larger, and bad." Stuart Tay-
lor Jr., Throwing Out 'Three Strikes', THE RECORDER, Jan. 13, 1994, at 6.
A detailed study of how the criminal justice system responded to another
"get tough on crime" measure demonstrates that the results of such proposals
are rarely what proponents and voters anticipate. CANDACE MCCOY, POLITICS
AND PLEA BARGAINING (1993). In 1982, the voters of California passed Proposi-
tion 8, the "Victims' Bill of Rights" which ostensibly put an end to what propo-
nents claimed was the corrupt process of plea bargaining. Id. at 20-49. The
measure prohibited all plea bargaining in cases charging serious felonies, with
the intent of ensuring that all serious criminals stood trial and received maxi-
mum sentences instead of pleading guilty to a lesser charge. Id. at 29. Because
the system is dependant on guilty pleas, the practical effect of the law was not
to end plea bargaining in serious cases, but simply to move the plea bargaining
process from superior court to municipal court, where cases could be "plead out"
before they officially became "serious felonies." Id. at 89-129.
217. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
218. Taylor, supra note 216, at 6.
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Second, judges, faced with defendants who do not de-
serve life in prison, and who resent the erosion of judicial dis-
cretion in sentencing, will be forced to creatively spurn the
law. The response is understandable and began almost im-
mediately upon passage of three strikes, as judges across the
state refused, in one way or another, to follow the clear man-
date of the legislature.219
Third, parole boards and corrections officials will be
under tremendous pressure to create prison space for defend-
ants caught in the three strikes net.220 As a flood of new
three strikes defendants enter the corrections system, eligible
for only a 20% reduction of sentence for good time,22 ' correc-
tions officials will be forced to release prisoners who are al-
ready in the system to make room for new inductees.2 22 Be-
cause prison officials may not base the timing of a prisoner's
release on an assessment of the individual's danger to soci-
ety,228 some of the prisoners released may be violent career
criminals like Richard Allen Davis.224 To put it simply, as
the front end of the prison pipeline becomes more crowded,
the system will make room for the new inductees by releasing
prisoners nearing the end of their sentences.
What is the ultimate result of such contortions of the
criminal justice system? According to Justice Breyer, the re-
219. See, e.g., People v. Miller, No. 171-325, slip op. at 4 (Super. Ct. Santa
Clara County June 14, 1994) (order on motion for post-indictment hearing to
consider § 17(b)(5) reduction); People v. Reese, No. 94-0714-7, slip op. at 15
(Super. Ct. Contra Costa County Dec. 21, 1994) (memorandum of decision to
strike prior convictions); Scott Graham, Trial Judges Trying to Determine Their
Role in Three Strikes Cases, THE RECORDER, Sept. 27, 1994, at 3 (reporting on a
judicial conference at which most judges agreed that the law would be declared
unconstitutional on a case by case basis); Ron Sonenshine, Judge's Challenge to
'3 Strikes'Law, S.F. CHRON., July 21, 1994, at A15 (describing a case in which a
Sonoma County judge declared three strikes cruel and unusual).
220. Taylor, supra note 216, at 6.
221. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
222. See Taylor, supra note 216, at 6.
223. Friedman & Rose, supra note 76, § 37.4. In 1977, California passed the
Determinate Sentencing Law providing that, with few exceptions, prison terms
would be determined by the nature of the crime committed rather than by the
danger of the particular offender to society. Id.
224. Taylor, supra note 216, at 6. The author argues that determinate sen-
tencing may have led to the release of Richard Allen Davis in the first instance,
noting that even if court and corrections authorities had recognized Davis' po-
tential for violence, the determinate sentencing law and the need to make room
for more prisoners would have prevented them from imprisoning him any
longer. Id.
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sult is a diminution in the integrity of the system and a gen-
eral disrespect for the law.225 As he stated in May of 1994,
[F]inally, what you'll discover as a result of this mess -
because that's what I would describe it as, a mess - you'll
discover not only unfairness, not only failure to punish
where there ought to be some punishment, but you'll see
everybody sweeping everything under the rug. Because
you're not going to find prosecutors really saying publicly
they don't prosecute or judges saying, well, I sort of cut
him a little here or there, whatever it is.
Rather what grows generally is you have a law that
can't really be enforced, and when you have that, you have
disrespect for law. And you have the public feeling some-
thing is going wrong, but you're not quite sure what. And
you have everyone acting a little bit hypocritically.
226
The erosion of the integrity of the criminal justice system
described by Justice Breyer is greatly excacerbated by the in-
flexibility of three srtikes. The inability of the judge to reduce
wobblers 227 or strike prior convictions228 eliminates the cru-
cial screening device of judicial discretion and greatly in-
creases both the cost of three strikes and the pressure on the
judicial system. As Justice Breyer points out, there is an ex-
ception to every rule. 9  In the three strikes scenario, the ex-
ception is the nonviolent offender who poses no serious threat
to society but must be incarcerated for life nonetheless.2 3 0 A
modification of three strikes that provides for increased judi-
cial discretion will serve as a sort of systemic pressure release
valve, allowing the judge to weed out truly nonviolent offend-
ers and significantly reduce the cost of the law.
F. The Efficacy of the Early Decisions
Judges Manoukian and Arnason were among the first
California judges forced to respond to the three strikes di-
lemma. In attempting to abide by the law and at the same
time maintain judicial discretion to cope with the myriad
complexities of three strikes, each judge developed a unique
solution to the three strikes dilemma. It is almost certain
225. Breyer, supra note 215, at 18.
226. Id.
227. See discussion supra part II.D.
228. See discussion supra part II.C.9.
229. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
230. See discussion supra part W.C.3.
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that these cases, or similar cases, will be appealed to the Cali-
fornia Supeme Court, which will ultimately settle three
strikes law.231 This section examines the Miller and Reese
decisions for the effectiveness of their respective solutions
and the likely success of such solutions on appeal.
1. People v. Miller
In People v. Miller, Judge Manoukian held that the court
retained the authority, pursuant to section 17(b), to reduce
an alternate felony-misdemeanor crime, or wobbler, from a
felony to a misdemeanor.23 2 If upheld on appeal, the decision
will provide judges with some discretion in dealing with three
strikes, and will help prevent some of the inequitable and fi-
nancially unsound results that can occur when prosecutors
choose to charge wobblers by indictment.
The Miller decision should be upheld on appeal in spite of
the Bowens proscription on post-indictment preliminary
hearings because the defendants in the two cases were denied
very different rights. In Bowens, the defendant sought a
post-indictment preliminary hearing at which the prosecutor
would be required to show probable cause to hold the defend-
ant for trial in the superior court.2 3 The defendant claimed
he was denied equal protection because defendants prose-
cuted by complaint in municipal court were afforded the op-
portunity to challenge probable cause at the preliminary
hearing.234 The crucial issue in Bowens, therefore, was
whether and how the district attorney should be required to
show probable cause.23 5 The Bowens court correctly denied
the post-indictment preliminary hearing not because the in-
dicted defendant had no right to a determination of probable
cause, but because probable cause had already been deter-
mined by the grand jury in handing down its indictment.23 6
As such, the indicted defendant and the defendant charged by
complaint were both afforded a determination of probable
231. Kisliuk, supra note 15, at 2.
232. People v. Miller, No. 171-325, slip op. at 9 (Super. Ct. Santa Clara
County June 14, 1994) (order on motion for post-indictment hearing to consider
§ 17(b)(5) reduction).
233. Bowens v. Superior Court, 820 P.2d 600, 606 (Cal. 1991).
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
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cause, albeit in different forums, and the indicted defendant
was, therefore, not denied a fundamental right.2" 7
The situation was quite different in Miller, where, in the
absence of a post-indictment judicial consideration of a sec-
tion 17(b) reduction, the defendant would be denied the op-
portunity to present evidence to the court that the circum-
stances of his case warranted such a reduction.23 8 The
distinction is crucial. Whereas in Bowens the defendant was
afforded a determination of probable cause in an alternative
manner,23 9 the indicted defendant in Miller would be denied
entirely the possibility of a section 17(b) reduction.24 °
Although the grand jury makes a determination of probable
cause, it is not a judicial body, and therefore lacks the author-
ity to grant or even consider the reduction of a felony wobbler
to a misdemeanor.24 1
In addition, the Kong decision apparently survived the
Bowens ruling that criminal defendants have no right to a
post-indictment preliminary hearing, at least to the extent
that it authorizes the court to grant a section 17(b) reduction
after an indictment.242 Both Kong and Miller correctly point
out that the Bowens court had no cause to consider and, in-
deed, never mentioned the right to a post-indictment section
17(b) reduction. 243 The Bowens court proscribed post-indict-
ment preliminary hearings to determine probable cause, 2 "
but in Miller, the defendant asked for neither a preliminary
hearing nor a determination of probable cause.245 Therefore,
the Miller defendant's request for a post-indictment judicial
determination of the validity of a section 17(b) reduction falls
outside the scope of the Bowens decision.246
237. Id. at 607.
238. People v. Miller, No. 171-325, slip op. at 9 (Super. Ct. Santa Clara
County June 14, 1994) (order on motion for post-indictment hearing to consider
§ 17(b)(5) reduction).
239. Bowens v. Superior Court, 820 P.2d 600, 606 (Cal. 1991).
240. People v. Miller, No. 171-325, slip op. at 9-10 (Super. Ct. Santa Clara
County June 14, 1994) (order on motion for post-indictment hearing to consider
§ 17(b)(5) reduction).
241. See supra note 101.
242. See supra notes 118-22 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 118-22 and accompanying text.
244. See supra note 102.
245. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
246. See discussion supra part II.E.1.
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Finally, Judge Manoukian outlined, but did not thor-
oughly detail, the nature of the judicial determination of
whether a wobbler is a misdemeanor or a felony.247 Bowens
clearly forbids a full scale preliminary hearing, a "quasi-pre-
liminary hearing," or "any other similar procedure."24 The
judicial determination suggested in Miller appears to be
nothing like a preliminary hearing and, in fact, may not re-
quire a hearing at all.249 Instead, Judge Manoukian de-
scribed a procedure whereby a judge reviews the transcript of
the grand jury hearing, the defendant's prior criminal his-
tory, and any favorable or unfavorable probation reports.2 5 °
Again, because this procedure would not be a hearing, let
alone a preliminary or quasi-preliminary hearing, it falls
outside the scope of the Bowens decision.25'
The Miller decision is an intelligent and pragmatic re-
sponse to one of the difficult problems 252 created by three
strikes. The judicial determination Judge Manoukian sug-
gests would be quick and inexpensive, and it would grant in-
dicted defendants the same opportunity for section 17(b) re-
ductions that defendants prosecuted by complaint now enjoy.
Moreover, a court that chooses to reduce a wobbler following
the Miller approach would be doing so on the record in a
forthright manner, preventing the kind of surreptitious eva-
sion of the law envisioned by Justice Breyer.25 3
2. People v. Reese
In People v. Reese, the court held that judges retained the
power to strike prior convictions in furtherance of justice254
in spite of language to the contrary in both the initiative and
statutory versions of three strikes,25 and in spite of an ex-
plicit bar to judicial discretion to strike prior convictions for
enhancement purposes contained in section 1385(b).256
While the Reese rationale is an understandable attempt to
247. See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
248. See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 118-22 and accompanying text.
252. See supra note 92.
253. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
254. See discussion supra part II.E.2.
255. See supra note 130.
256. See supra note 87.
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cope with the diminution of judicial discretion caused by
three strikes, it is unlikely to survive appeal and perhaps
best serves as an example of the extent to which the judiciary
chafes under three strikes.
The Reese decision relies almost entirely on the proposi-
tion that the initiative measure is the one and only three
strikes law of the state.25 7 The court reached this conclusion
by determining that the legislative and initiative measures
were "competing," rather than "complementary" or "supple-
mentary" measures.25 8 It is difficult to understand how the
two measures could compete, given the fact that the text of
the two versions is virtually identical. 259 Furthermore, if the
intent of the initiative was to compete with the statutory ver-
sion, the voters who signed the initiative would have been
staging a rather odd competition, a choice between whether
the statutory provisions of three strikes should appear as Pe-
nal Code section 667 or as Penal Code section 1170.12.260
Such a choice would have been futile, and was almost cer-
tainly not the intent of the voters in passing the three strikes
initiative.
Rather, the voters more likely intended to ratify the ex-
isting three strikes law. By passing the initiative even after
the prior legislation, the voters made it much more difficult
for the legislature to repeal or modify three strikes.
26 1 If
there was any "competition" between measures, it was be-
tween the existing legislative version and various other three
strikes proposals pending in the legislature both before and
after passage of the final statutory version.262 Thus, the
court is only partially correct in stating "there is but one ver-
sion of the three strike law, the people's version." 26 1 Since
the two are textually identical, there is truly only one sub-
stantive three strikes law in California. Whether "the peo-
257. See supra notes 134-38 and accompanying text.
258. See supra note 135.
259. See supra notes 57-67 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
262. When the legislature passed three strikes as A.B. 971, there were four
other three strikes proposals pending in the legislature. STAFF OF SENATE
COMM. ON JUDICIARY, 1993-94 REGuLAR SESS., STAFF MATERMALS ON THREE
STRIKES 9 (Feb. 17, 1994).
263. People v. Reese, No. 94-0714-7, slip op. at 15 (Super. Ct. Contra Costa
County Dec. 21, 1994) (memorandum of decision to strike prior convictions).
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ple's version" will be ratified by the Supreme Court to the to-
tal exclusion of the legislative version is much more doubtful.
Because the courts are likely to consider the two versions
as complementary measures, the impact of section 1385 on
three strikes is unclear. Section 1385(a) gives the judge
broad authority to strike prior convictions, while section
1385(b) explicitly prevents the court from striking a prior
conviction charged for enhancement purposes under section
667.264 Because the legislature passed section 1385(b) with
the clear intent of limiting the court's ability to strike prior
convictions,26 5 this limitation could rationally be applied to
three strikes, which has replaced section 667 as the state's
primary enhancement statute.266 Furthermore, in the ab-
sence of strained statutory construction, three strikes on its
face appears to give only the prosecutor the authority to
strike prior convictions in the interest of justice.26 7 It ap-
pears, then, that the Reese solution to the three strikes re-
striction on judicial authority to strike priors is not likely to
survive on appeal. This is not to say, however, that the Reese
court was incorrect in seeking such discretion, or that there is
no other method of granting judges the authority to strike
prior convictions.
V. PROPOSAL
There are significant problems with the current three
strikes law. While the measure will have the desired effect of
reducing violent crime,268 it will have other negative results
that were probably not anticipated by those who drafted the
measure or the voters who approved it. Most notably, three
strikes will be extraordinarily expensive.269 In addition, it
will ensnare many essentially nonviolent offenders in its
overly broad net,2 7 0 resulting in tremendous pressure on the
264. See supra note 87.
265. The legislature declared: "It is the intent of the Legislature ... to re-
strict the authority of the trial court to strike prior convictions of serious felo-
nies when imposing an enhancement [pursuant to section 667]." 1986 Cal. Stat.
ch. 85, sec. 3, at 211-12.
266. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
267. See supra note 130.
268. See discussion supra part V.A.
269. See discussion supra part IV.B.
270. See discussion supra part IV.C.
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criminal justice system. 271 Finally, the combined effect of
three strikes will be an erosion of the integrity of the criminal
justice system.272 The challenge then, and the object of these
proposals, is to amend or interpret three strikes in a manner
that preserves the elements of the law that truly strike at
violent criminals, while eliminating its less desirous
provisions.
A. Judicial Action
1. Wobblers and the Miller Decision
California judges will continue to find creative responses
to three strikes, and an entire series of three strikes cases
will eventually reach the California Supreme Court, which
will ultimately settle three strikes law.273 When the court
considers the role of wobblers in the three strikes scenario, it
should adopt the solution proposed by Judge Manoukian in
People v. Miller, which allows indicted defendants a judicial
determination of whether a wobbler is a misdemeanor.274
Opponents of post-indictment section 17(b) reductions
may ask why indicted defendants should suddenly be pro-
vided with a hearing when they have been denied such hear-
ings since 1991.275 The answer lies in the tendency of prose-
cutors to charge three strikes offenses only by indictment.2 76
In the past, defendants charged with wobblers were routinely
charged by complaint, with prosecutors reserving the grand
jury procedure for more serious cases.2 77 With the possibility
of life in prison, every three strikes case has become a serious
one, and defense attorneys are prepared to file every motion
and use every tactic conceivable to protect their clients.2 7 8
When faced with such expensive and time-consuming prelim-
inary hearings, it is only natural for the prosecutor to bypass
271. See discussion supra part 1V.D.
272. See discussion supra part 1V.E.
273. See Kisliuk, supra note 15, at 2.
274. See discussion supra part II.E.1.
275. See supra note 102.
276. See supra notes 106-10 and accompanying text.
277. Guthman & Ladar, supra note 93, § 8.8.
278. See CALiFoRNIA ArroRNEYS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 62, at
125. Albert J. Menaster, a defense attorney, suggests 10 ways to avoid three
strikes before trial. Id.
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such difficulties by charging through indictment.279 In the
process, defendants charged by indictment are denied the op-
portunity for a section 17(b) reduction that is afforded those
charged by complaint.
By providing indicted defendants with a post-indictment
judicial determination of whether a wobbler should be re-
duced to a misdemeanor, the court would achieve three laud-
able objectives. First, the indicted defendant would be placed
on equal footing with those defendants charged by complaint.
Second, the trial court would have the discretion to apply the
harsh three strikes sentence only to those truly violent felons
to whom the law was intended to apply. Finally, selective
post-indictment reductions for essentially nonviolent felons
would help ease some of the pressure on the criminal justice
system created by three strikes.
2. Prior Convictions and the Reese Decision
While it would be tempting for the Supreme Court to
adopt the position of the Reese court by allowing judges to
exercise their section 1385 authority28 ° to strike prior convic-
tions in furtherance of justice,28 1 the court should refrain
from doing so. Although section 1385(b) should be repealed
to allow judges to strike prior convictions, the section should
be repealed by the Legislature rather than the court.
First, adoption of the Reese approach would overrule le-
gitimate legislation and reject the will of the voters through
strained and hyper-technical statutory interpretation.2 82 Al-
most certainly, the intent of the voters in passing the initia-
tive measure was to ratify the existing three strikes law em-
bodied in the legislative version.28 3 A decision based on a
legal technicality would be an unwise and somewhat dishon-
est exercise in judicial activism.
Second, such a decision would likely be viewed by the
Legislature and voters as another example of an arrogant ju-
diciary thumbing its nose at the electorate, resulting in even
279. The words of Santa Clara County District Attorney George Kennedy re-
garding the use of grand jury indictments in three strike cases illustrate the
point: "I think rm doing the taxpayers a favor by not clogging up municipal
court with lengthy motions." Gonzales, supra note 108, at B4P.
280. See supra note 87.
281. See discussion supra part II.E.2.
282. See discussion supra part IV.F.2.
283. See supra notes 257-62 and accompanying text.
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more restrictive legislative or initiative measures.28 4 Califor-
nia Supreme Court decisions of the 1970's and 1980's, based
on strained rationales similar to Reese, resulted in legislative
and initiative measures that greatly reduced judicial author-
ity, in addition to the ouster of three supreme court jus-
tices.28 5 It would be a mistake for the court to return to the
activism that led to the restriction on judicial discretion in
the first instance.
B. Legislative Action in Furtherance of the Intent of the
Voters
The California Legislature should take immediate steps
to reform three strikes law. Because three strikes was ap-
proved by voter initiative, any modifications must be in fur-
therance of the voters' intent in enacting the law.28 6 Accord-
ing to the text of the three strikes initiative, the intent of the
voters in passing the law was to ensure longer prison
sentences for repeat violent or serious offenders.28 7 The fol-
lowing proposals will further that intent by preserving those
elements of the law that ensure longer sentences for truly
dangerous criminals. The law would be modified, however, to
allow judges to apply three strikes based upon the particular
circumstances of each case. The result will be an efficient
and enforceable three strikes law that achieves the intent of
the voters without emptying the state treasury or bringing
the criminal justice system to its knees.
1. Allow the Court to Strike Prior Convictions in
Furtherance of Justice
Instead of waiting for the courts to determine the author-
ity of judges to strike prior convictions in three strikes cases,
284. J. Clark Kelso & Brigitte A. Bass, The Victim's Bill of Rights: Where Did
It Come from and How Much Did It Do?, 23 PAC. L.J. 843 (1992). The authors
chronicle how a series of California Supreme Court decisions in the 1970's and
1980's that expanded the rights of criminal defendants alienated the electorate.
Id. at 859. The voters responded through the initiative process by passing
Proposition 8 and Proposition 115 which significantly reduced the discretion of
trial judges at sentencing. Id. at 843-44.
285. Id. at 844. After the court reversed the imposition of the death penalty
in twenty-two of twenty-four cases between 1977 and 1982, the voters re-
sponded by rejecting three supreme court justices, including Chief Justice Rose
Bird. Id.
286. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
287. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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the Legislature should amend three strikes to explicitly grant
judges such authority. In addition, the Legislature should re-
peal the section 1385(b) limitation on judicial discretion.2"'
An increase in judicial discretion would have the practical ef-
fect of curbing many of the problems associated with three
strikes.
First, judicial discretion to strike prior convictions would
promote justice by allowing judges to fairly and forthrightly
sentence nonviolent offenders to something less than life in
prison. Second, the reduction in the number of offenders
serving life in prison would considerably reduce the cost of
three strikes. Third, the exclusion of many nonviolent offend-
ers from the scope of three strikes would reduce the number
of three strikes hearings, motions, and jury trials, greatly re-
ducing the pressure three strikes places on the judicial sys-
tem. Finally, while most prosecutors will wisely strike the
prior convictions of those nonviolent defendants for whom life
in prison would be cruel and unjust, increased judicial discre-
tion would serve as an important check on the occasionally
overzealous district attorney.
2. Eliminate the No Washout Provision of Three
Strikes
State legislators should remove the no washout provi-
sion 2s 9 from three strikes and explicitly allow judges to con-
sider the length of time between the prior felony conviction
and the current offense when imposing strike sentences. The
Legislature should not, however, replace the no washout pro-
vision with a strict washout period of five, ten, or fifteen
years.
A strict washout provision suffers the same weakness as
a no washout provision, namely, that it is inflexible and pre-
vents the judge from exercising common sense when faced
with an exception to the rule. A brief hypothetical illustrates
the point: a defendant is convicted of rape on two separate
occasions and serves time in prison for each offense. After
being released from prison on the second rape, the defendant
avoids a life of crime, or at least avoids detection, for a period
of eleven years. After eleven years, the defendant is con-
288. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
289. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
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victed of a third rape. If the legislature had passed a ten year
washout period, the sentencing judge would be required to ig-
nore the first two convictions. The defendant could therefore
escape enhanced punishment for the prior offenses in spite of
the fact that he is precisely the kind of violent criminal three
strikes was designed to imprison for life. Any mandatory
washout period would, in certain cases, prevent judges from
imposing full life sentences on dangerous violent felons.
Instead of mandating a certain number of years after
which prior convictions are "washed out," the Legislature
should simply eliminate the no washout provision. This mod-
ification of three strikes would allow judges to apply three
strikes selectively based on the particular facts and circum-
stances of each case. When the prior offenses are relatively
minor, the court would be permitted to ignore prior convic-
tions at its discretion even if there was a relatively short pe-
riod of time between offenses. When the prior offenses and
the current offense are violent or serious, the court would be
permitted to consider the prior history of violence, irrespec-
tive of the age of the prior convictions. Such a modification
would infuse three strikes with a flexible element of justice
and common sense without sacrificing any of its tough crime
fighting provisions. Judges could impose life sentences on vi-
olent criminals and refrain from applying the law when life in
prison would be unjust.
C. Voter Initiative
Along with the Governor and the Legislature, prominent
citizens who have been active in the fight against crime, peo-
ple such as Marc Klaas and Mike Reynolds, should reexamine
the costs of three strikes and actively support alternative
crime reduction proposals. The process may already have
begun, as Marc Klaas actively opposed the three strikes
initiative.29 °
A number of alternatives have been proposed by the
RAND Corporation in a report comparing the current law
with possible alternatives. 291 The study evaluates three
strikes and the alternative proposals by comparing relative
costs to effectiveness in reducing violent crime.292 The report
290. See discussion supra part IIA.2.
291. GREENWOOD ET AL., supra note 67, at 4-9.
292. Id.
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indicates that certain less expensive proposals could be
equally effective in combating violent crime.29 3
For instance, one proposal that RAND explored is called
the "Full Term" option.2 9 4 This alternative consists of only
three provisions.295 First, all convictions for serious or vio-
lent felonies would result in state prison terms, regardless of
whether the defendant had any prior convictions.296 Second,
felons convicted of serious or violent felonies would receive no
time off for good behavior, resulting in longer sentences for
truly violent offenders.29 7 Finally, the proposal would at-
tempt to cut in half the number of people sent to state prison
for relatively minor crimes by sentencing most of such de-
fendants to either county jail or probation.2 98
The "Full Term" proposal would guarantee longer terms
for violent felons by sentencing such felons to state prison af-
ter their first violent offense.299 In addition, violent felons
would be kept off the streets for longer periods as a result of
the no time off provision.300 RAND estimates that such a pro-
posal would match the crime cutting effectiveness of three
strikes, but would cost significantly less.30 '
VI. CONCLUSION
California Legislators and voters passed three strikes
legislation as a direct response to the well publicized Polly
Klaas tragedy. Voters demanded greater protection from vio-
lent felons. Politicians, sensing the mood of the electorate,
hastily passed the readily available three strikes proposal.
Californians are correct to demand life in prison for danger-
ous career criminals such as Richard Allen Davis, and the
law will indeed reduce violent crime. Unfortunately, the law
was poorly drafted and never properly studied before being
passed by the Legislature and the voters. The result is a
three strikes law that sweeps too broadly, incarcerating
many essentially nonviolent offenders at enormous cost to
293. Id. at xiii.
294. Id. at 9.
295. Id.
296. GREENWOOD ET AL., supra note 67, at 9.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 27.
300. Id.
301. GREENWOOD ET AL., supra note 67, at 27-29.
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taxpayers. By its overly broad scope, the law will place an
unbearable strain on the criminal justice system, resulting in
an eventual reduction in the integrity of the process.
Trial courts immediately responded to the three strikes
dilemma by claiming considerable judicial discretion in ap-
plying the law. The California Supreme Court should en-
dorse the movement for greater judicial discretion by al-
lowing trial judges to reduce wobblers to misdemeanors. In
addition, the Legislature should modify three strikes to allow
judges to strike prior convictions in the interest of justice and
provide for a flexible washout provision that allows judges to
consider or disregard prior convictions as the circumstances
demand.
These modifications would streamline three strikes and
eliminate undue expense and pressure on the judicial system
without compromising the effectiveness of the law in reduc-
ing violent crime. In the absence of these or similar modifica-
tions, the state is faced with the unsavory choice of either a
massive tax increase, or a three strikes law and criminal jus-
tice system that simply cannot deliver what the voters de-
mand and deserve.
Loren L. Barr
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